This article examines the clash between Superior General Claudio Acquaviva and the Spanish Jesuit Hernando de Mendoça, briefly confessor to the viceroy of Naples count of Lemos (1599Lemos ( -1601. It argues that Mendoça's activities in Naples and the scandal that followed were an important influence on Acquaviva's determination to formalize and push forward the regulations for princely confessors in 1602. It situates the confrontation within the context of the discontent amongst Spanish Jesuits, and their criticism of Acquaviva's generalate. While Jesuit historiography has generally considered Mendoça's case as an example of individual folly and disobedience, the essay elucidates the significance of his agency by taking into account his overlooked writings, which offer new insights into the controversy over the role of confession for just government within and without the Society of Jesus.
anxiety and perplexity amongst his companions.1 As years went by, these concerns deepened, and by the late sixteenth century the order was divided over the merits of continuing the policy.2 In good Jesuit fashion, these anxieties led to the establishment of a set of decrees. After the fifth general congregation of 1593/94 had warned that princely confessors must not meddle "with public affairs" or "reason of state" and should avoid "seeking familiarity with princes,"3 in 1602 General Claudio Acquaviva (1543-1615) started drafting more specific rules. The idea that confessors should focus on their pastoral mission and eschew secular business remained the backbone of the final instruction for princely confessors, eventually ratified at the sixth general congregation in 1608. Thanks to Robert Bireley's research, we are well informed on the stages in the establishment of the rules De confessariis principum, as well as on the severe limitations regarding their application when put to the test during the Thirty Years' War.4 This essay focuses on an affair that might have been a decisive but hitherto overlooked influence on Acquaviva's determination in 1602 to define the rules for princely confessors more precisely. Amidst the drafts for these rules are papers on an inquest into the "scandalous" Spanish Jesuit Hernando de Mendoça (1562 Mendoça ( -1617 , briefly confessor to the viceroy of Naples, Don Fernando Ruiz de Castro Andrade y Portugal, sixth count of Lemos (1548 Lemos ( -1601 . The location of these inquest papers next to the draft rules suggests a chronological and thematic interconnection between them.5 Not only did Mendoça's spell in Naples journal of jesuit studies 4 (2017) (1599-1602) coincide with the period during which Acquaviva was completing the new guidelines, it also raised issues that were directly relevant to some of the problems these attempted to solve. Moreover, when Mendoça returned to Spain in 1603 as confessor to the viceroy's widow Doña Catalina de Sandoval (1555 Sandoval ( -1628 , the affair took a threatening turn that subverted the superior general's most fundamental attribute, namely his capacity to elicit and impose obedience.6 The evidence of the Mendoça affair suggests that Acquaviva's disciplining of princely confessors was concerned not merely to protect the order against exterior criticism but also to limit these confessors' potentially disruptive effect on the Society's interior hierarchy and cohesion.
The general's struggle with Mendoça had considerable local, international, political, and religious ramifications. It is best understood in the context of the deep crisis that agitated the order at the turn of the sixteenth century, after a "Spanish revolt" had developed after the death of the last Spanish general, Francisco de Borja (1510-72; in office, 1565-72) .7 As is well-known, the conflict took more dramatic forms under Acquaviva and peaked around the general congregations of 1593 and 1608, which frame the Mendoça affair chronologically. The discontent amongst Spanish Jesuits offered the Spanish crown as well as the papacy long-sought opportunities to challenge the authority of the Jesuit general from different angles, and for different motives. In Spain, the Jesuits' privileges and their distinctive Constitutions conflicted with the Inquisition as well as with the crown's aspiration to control the national clergy. In Rome, questions of doctrine, but also papal authority and influence over the general were at issue. Although some scholars have alluded to Mendoça's role in these events, the nature of his involvement is little understood.8 Jesuit historians in signed by Acquaviva on February 10, 1602 on ff. 540r-541v. Vipera's mission to Naples was in January 1602: arsi, Neap. 6-ii, ff. 470v-472v: Acquaviva to Padre Fabio, provincial of Naples, January 26, 1602. 6 A confused and Manichean account of Mendoça's return to Spain, oblivious to the Neapolitan link is in José Martínez Millán, "La doble lealtad en la corte de Felipe iii: El enfrentamiento entre los padres R. Haller S.I. y F. de Mendoça S.I.," Librosdelacorte.es 1 (2014): 136-62. 7 On Mercurian's election, the following anti-converso policies and the exodus of leading Spanish Jesuits, see Robert A. they all set sail to Italy without awaiting the consent of Mendoça's superior.21 Such nonchalance set the pattern for the following years, and Acquaviva initially seemed content to go along with this: he granted virtually all of Doña Catalina's "requests" to award her confessor with privileges and exemptions from constraining rules, and when Mendoça took his fourth vow, the countess received permission to hold a splendid public celebration.22 Contrary to the later allegations suggesting that Mendoça had always led a scandalous life, when Acquaviva in 1599 requested certificates of his good conduct in Spain and Naples, before admitting him to the last vows, no concerns were raised.23
The reasons for Acquaviva's generosity towards Mendoça and his patrons can be easily identified: they established a relationship of mutual obligation full of symbolic and political potential. The countess was not only Lerma's sister. The siblings, through their mother, were also the grandchildren of the last Spanish Jesuit general, Francisco de Borja.24 Mendoça could now provide access to a family which was at once "Jesuit royalty" and in control of Philip iii (1578-1621) and his court. Both were of enormous strategic importance: proximity to the Sandoval-Borja connection could be a means to overcome the sense of alienation and resentment that had animated the Spanish Jesuit "rebels" for decades, whilst Lerma's protection could help to acquire vital royal favor for the entire order. Keeping the Sandovals happy was a bonus however one regarded it. It was especially crucial at this particular moment, when a condemnation of Molinism, with fatal consequences for the order's identity and maybe its very existence seemed likely.25 But Acquaviva soon discovered the limits of this deceptively promising arrangement. Signs that it was starting to backfire emerged in the late summer of 1600, when the countess complained that Jesuits in the province of Naples had started "badmouthing" Mendoça. With some anxiety, Acquaviva reminded the Neapolitan Jesuits how vital maintaining the affection of the Lemos was for the Society.26 Yet when the viceroy died in October 1601 and his widow stayed on with her second son Don Francisco Ruiz de Castro (1579-1637), who acted as interim-viceroy, serious mud-slinging began. The preposito of Naples reported that according to one of his lady penitents secret plans existed to "elevate Mendoça to a bishopric," and that he had used his position to line his pockets.27 Mendoça was accused of acting in a secular fashion, indulging in elegant clothing, silk slippers, and nocturnal outings. As the Jesuit secretary recorded, a few years later:
People were grievously pained by his haughty imperiousness, his interest in and greed for money, and the favor he showed to the undeserving, whilst he burdened others and treated them without courtesy and most illiberally. He conducted himself with some women in a manner unbecoming to a religious. […] He put people and their offices at risk.
[…] People considered him the origin of their woes and behind him the Society that put up with him.28 Doña Catalina was furious, and informed Acquaviva as well as her friends and family in Spain, that a cabal of viceregal councillors and local Jesuits spread the most shameless gossip.29 The general immediately ordered a special envoy to travel to Rome and inform him in person,30 and when some days later, he received a list of the suspected slanderers amongst the Neapolitan fathers, 26 arsi, Neap. 6-i, f. 240r: Acquaviva to Carlo Mastrelli, August 19, 1600. This was also the concern with regard to Richard Haller, the confessor of Queen Margarita, who was one of Lerma's fiercest critics. In 1604, Haller was forced to send a long justification to the general explaining that he had not been hostile to the valido, arsi, Cast. he ordered them to retract: "For God's sake let's be cautious and not lap up everything that laymen tell us, even when they do so moved by zeal, because dies mali sunt [times are bad], and sometimes the very people who complain are the authors of what they complain about and then make us authors of the fables they tell."31 Yet, his attempts to soothe the situation failed, matters turning openly hostile when in January 1602 Acquaviva sent Francesco Vipera (1532-1605), former provincial of Genoa, to Naples with orders to conduct a full investigation. The instructions to Vipera show that although Acquaviva did not believe the allegations that Mendoça had taken kick-backs for favors, he accepted that he had behaved foolishly and like a courtier.32 The main problem, however, was the choice of Vipera as investigator. Mendoça and the countess interpreted it as a deliberate provocation and personal offence, since they had clashed with him already in Genoa when on their way to Naples he had objected to Mendoça staying not in the Jesuit house but in the palace with the Lemos couple.33
The countess therefore refused to receive Vipera and Mendoça at this point apparently wrote a defiant letter to the general, which Acquaviva was later forced to hand over the pope. Acquaviva's reaction was weary, "paternally" admonishing his "subject" to reflect on the tone he adopted. The general was outraged at the condesa's threat that, if he did not banish the accused fathers immediately, she would withdraw her protection from the order. Acquaviva regarded this as intolerable and reflecting a failure by Mendoça in his pastoral role: the confessor's first duty of obedience was to God and the general, not to his penitent; it was his responsibility to call the countess to order, reminding her that her affection for her confessor must be directed not towards his person, but towards the Society of Jesus as a body.34 Yet Mendoça and Doña Catalina made it clear that they considered themselves above the Jesuit chain of obedience. They appealed directly to Clement viii to grant a brief that not only cleared Mendoça's name, but also prohibited any investigation into his conduct. When the countess returned to Spain to become lady-in-waiting to the Queen, the pope granted Mendoça a host of privileges that allowed him to 31 arsi, Neap. 6-ii, f. 401r: Acquaviva to Carlo Mastrelli, November 24, 1601; ibid. Acquaviva to Luca Spinelli, preposito di Napoli, November 24, 1601. 32 arsi, Inst. 117-ii, ff. 487r-488v. 33
arsi, Neap. 6-ii, ff. 470v-472v: Acquaviva to Padre Fabio, provincial of Naples, January 26, 1602; ff. 473r-474r: Acquaviva to Vipera, January 26, 1602. 34 arsi, Neap. 6-ii, ff. 472v-473v: Acquaviva to Mendoça, January 26, 1602; f. 472v: "dirò confidentemente e paternamente a lei non penso di rispondere parola adesso, perchè è scritta con tal termine, che pare che il scrittore non si ricordasse ne di che, ne a chi scriveva."
conduct his office as her confessor in whatever way he pleased, without supervision from his superiors.35
The confrontation with Mendoça undoubtedly convinced Acquaviva how urgent it was to clarify, reinforce, and implement instructions for princely confessors, and some passages in the draft rules of 1602 are reminiscent of the general's problems during this episode. There was an insistence that the princely confessors must live as subjects of the ordinary and observe the habitual discretion and rules that apply to all, and there must be no exception, no matter under what pretext, even though the business they might conduct for the Prince requires secrecy […] . They must observe the Regula, and where there is abuse the Provincial has to impose himself and make sure that rules are observed […] they must not have, receive or hold any money, distribute or receive presents, because all these things, such as going out without permission and where they like, destroy the order and its spirit in the mind of people and they are in no way necessary to the service of the Prince or beneficial to his office.36
The regulations also stressed that the confessor must always work to "direct the Prince's affection and devotion to the Society, not to his own person, because this is a pestilence for him and the order."37 The Mendoça affair was in many ways a textbook case of the dangers inherent in supplying princes with confessors: sliding into worldliness was a matter not only of clothing and mingling with courtiers, but also of active involvement in "politics," particularly in the distribution of grace as part of government, through which the entire order attracted criticism of factionalism. Particularly worrying, however, were the repercussions on discipline. If critics of the Society of Jesus feared that Jesuit confessors used the confidence and access they enjoyed to exploit rulers in their order's interest, the example of Mendoça showed another-contrary-reality: that confessors might use their penitents' and patrons' affection for their own ends, to escape the constraints of their position and to defy the general's leadership, undermining the very principles of (Jesuit) obedience. even managed to mobilize papal authority to resist the general, giving a singular and unintended meaning to the Jesuit submission to the pontiff.
Tyranny and Confession
Mendoça's disobedience did not cease with his return to Spain. Using the royal court as his stage, he now pressed matters onto an ideological level, whipping up the still numerous Jesuit malcontents in Spain against the general.38 Despite the clamp-down on the Spanish perturbatores after the fifth general congregation in 1593, the Castilian province in particular continued to be riddled with strife, and the flow of memoranda denouncing the general's "tyranny," disorderly management, and disregard for the Spanish element within the Society, would not cease. A crucial aspect herein-which Mariana, however, left unmentioned-was the use of confession as an instrument of Jesuit government. The question was a particularly sensitive one, which the Jesuits' external critics and enemies like the Dominicans also tended to emphasize, suggesting in particular the Jesuits' regular infringements on the secrecy of confession.47 The Advis fuelled such accusations as it stressed the particularly damaging allegation that Jesuit regulations undermined the charitable precept of fraternal correction. The problem of "fraternal correction" was hotly debated in sixteenth-century Spain, exposing tensions and contradictions between the authority of confessors and inquisitors.48 The precept based on Matthew 18:15 was widely used in canon law and commonly applied in the governance of religious orders. Mendoça's complaints focused on his order's often ambiguous handling of the sacrament of penance amongst its members. The regulations prescribed not only that every Jesuit unveiled his conscience to his superior every six months outside confession, but also, and crucially, that during this process they must reveal the failings of their confrères. Once a year, they had to "manifest their consciences" to their superior, "in confession, or in secret," so that he could direct them "along the path of salvation."49 In addition, all Jesuits had to confess regularly to an appointed confessor of their professed houses who should not be the superior. However, in reserved cases only the superior could pronounce absolution, so he still gathered sensitive and confidential information on the men he ruled. This was highly problematic: obviously, superiors could not use information gathered in confession, but the boundaries between confession and administrative disciplining powers were blurred. It seemed unlikely that a superior would not put to use the knowledge he held via the "confessional," particularly as the fifth general congregation had included "sedition" and "disobedience" in the reserved cases. As Mendoça's experience demonstrated, this was a flexible category that could include anything from wardrobe extravagance to articulate institutional criticism.50 According to Mendoça, the system not only enabled superiors to identify and eliminate critical voices while formally preserving confessional secrecy, but also provided an open invitation 47 Mendoça, Advis, to the evil-minded to denounce their fellows or spread unfounded allegations. Hence many Jesuits, he claimed, tried to avoid confession altogether with obvious deleterious consequences for their and the order's spiritual health.51 Against this, Mendoça vehemently defended what he considered to be an imprescriptible right to fraternal correction to protect all Christians against damage to their most precious property, i.e. their fama and reputation, i.e. the essence of their honor.52 It could not be abolished by entering a religious order, and, as he stressed, nobody was asked formally to renounce to it upon entering the Society of Jesus. Jesuit practice therefore annihilated a core element of charity and justice, supporting the existing structural drift towards arbitrary and potentially tyrannical government. These allegations were not entirely new or original, but with Mendoça's arrival in Madrid they re-gained traction, giving credence to the anti-Jesuit myths that members of the Society as a matter of principle leaked and used information gained in confession.53 It is probably no coincidence that with Mendoça's return to Spain, Pedro de Ribadeneyra (1526-1611) felt prompted to react authoritatively to such criticism. In 1605, he published a large volume in defence of the Society and its Constitutions, on which he had been working for some time. Using an arsenal of theological authorities, his defensive Tratado sought to demonstrate that the Jesuit regulations were neither extravagant nor contrary to Catholic doctrine.54 He insisted that many of the traits under attack were common to a wide range of rules of the regular clergy, such as the Dominicans, and also defended the order's specific rules in terms of its particular missions and goals. Ribadeneyra emphasized that the critics had not understood that on entering a religious order, one submitted to a higher end; it was necessary therefore, to privilege "the benefit of the brother's soul over his fama and reputation."55 Ribadeneyra did not dignify the critics by giving their names, and he caricatured them as "a handful of young people, friends of liberty, enemies of rigor and religious observance, moved by self-interest."56
Distributive Justice and Good Counsel
Although official Jesuit records tend to regard Mendoça's lack of obedience, of which his lax conduct was just one symptom, as the reason for the scandal he caused in Naples, another text by Mendoça suggests an alternative explanation for why the report on him in 1606 remarked that he had angered the good society of Naples by showing favor "to the undeserving, whilst he burdened others and treated them without courtesy and most illiberally."57 What might have been at issue was how he counselled the viceroy in matters of conscience.
In 1602, shortly after Lemos's death, Mendoça published three small treatises on the principles he had followed in his office that appeared together under the title Tres tratados. They were a scathing indictment of venality and other abuses in the vice-kingdom, which have earned Mendoça the reputation of a "moral rigorist" (!) among social historians of Naples.58 The Tres tratados are indeed a perfectly serious piece of moral reasoning on the problem of acceptio personarum [so-called "respect of person"], the major sin against distributive justice, another controversial topic among Spanish moral theologians at that time.59 It revolved around the question of how far personal preference might influence the distribution of offices and royal grace, and whether venality was a cause of injustice because it prevented the appointment of the most The debate intensified at the beginning of the reign of Philip iii, when there were high hopes for an overhaul of royal administration, see Patrick Williams, "Philip iii and the Restoration of Spanish Government, 1598 -1603 ," English Historical Review 88, no. 4 (1973 qualified people, damaging the res publica and the common good.60 While the controversy was generally fought out in Latin folios authored by some of the major voices of Iberian second Scholasticism, Mendoça published his argument in Spanish, adding supporting expert statements in Latin by a handful of serious theologians from the kingdom of Naples. As he explained in his introduction, his tract was just the beginning, and he was prepared to follow up the details during confession, a remark that suggests that the treatise had already been under preparation during the viceroy's lifetime.61 Mendoça insisted that he was obliged to tackle this problem publicly, given the eye-watering levels of scandalous favoritism and venality in the administration of the vice-kingdom. He was forced to do so because the Neapolitan clergy out of ignorance or sinful lack of moral principles were an obstacle to moral and political reform. They had even accused him of being "scrupulous," no compliment given that moral theologians generally likened "scrupulosity" to a kind of moral hypochondria.62 The Tratados not only showcased how acceptio and venality had to be analyzed from the viewpoint of moral theology but also that Mendoça possessed the expert knowledge and moral competence to perform the office of confessor and counsellor of conscience to the man who was the king's "living image" in an important outpost of the Monarchia Hispanica.63 Mendoça publication reminded both his penitent and the public of the principles of just government and of the crucial role of confessors as counsellors to achieve it. Mendoça proceeded along a classical dialectical opposition of pro and contra arguments, to which he added a long conclusion that left no doubt about his judgement. The experts he quoted contradict the generally ventilated impression that Mendoça was just a mundane libertine. All the men who explicitly endorsed the Tratados were famous for their scholarly and moral rigor. There was the fellow Neapolitan Jesuit Martino Fornari (1547-1612), author of a rigorist confession manual, who had long taught at the Collegium Romanum. Another was the Theatine Giambattista del Tufo (d.1622) The Tres tratados examine the question of acceptio along the classical lines of distributive justice and ownership of offices. They argued that just government was ruined because principles of favoritism supplanted criteria of qualification and suitability, severely damaging justice and the reputation of the Spanish monarch vis-à-vis his subjects in the viceroyalty. Mendoça blamed the viceregal councillors and local administrators for falsely labelling their sins and vices as virtuous liberality. Unlimited liberality, he noted, always tipped over into injustice. Moreover, viceroys as royal lieutenants did not enjoy the same degree of liberty as the monarch they represented; their authority was defined and limited by royal laws.65 Importantly, adopting a line of reasoning championed by the Dominican Domingo Bañez (1528 Bañez ( -1604 , who had argued that offices were bona communia over which the res publica still held ownership, Mendoça insisted that neither kings, nor viceroys, fully owned the offices they distributed. Limits on venality, however, followed not only from the question of ownership but also from the principle that just government must protect the subjects' right to receive competent and qualified officers, which venality and favoritism undermined. 66 Mendoça stressed that Spanish legislation since the days of the Catholic Kings had always imposed severe limits on the sale of offices.67 He also rejected the presumption that customary law permitted it, denouncing such arguments as a badly disguised excuse for misgovernment and abuse of office. Customary laws, so Mendoça, anticipating here an argument Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) was to make in De legibus (1612), were null, unless they had been confirmed by royal ordinances.68
It is hardly surprising that Mendoça's robust legal and moral-theological denunciation of the commerce of offices and royal grace in the kingdom of Naples angered those who thrived on such practices, i.e. the local elites as well as the local clergy he accused of having failed in their duty of disciplining their consciences, as they should. If the ideas in the Tres tratados had indeed been the basis for his counsel to the viceroy, this might explain why the Neapolitan officers retaliated with damaging accusations about the confessor's moral corruption. The following (Jesuit) narrative that he was a loose cannon and morally dubious character, however, clearly jars with the support Mendoça had gathered from three clergymen famous for their impeccable conduct and doctrine. It points instead to deep divisions traversing the Neapolitan political and clerical elites and to the possibility that the accusations against Mendoça were partly a politically motivated fabrication to bring him down as soon as his powerful penitent drew his last breath. Yet, the timing of the publication of Tres tratados in 1602 also allows for a contrary interpretation. It is not beyond reasonable doubt to suggest that Mendoça used moral-theological arguments as a means of self-defence to discredit and delegitimize his critics. In any event, it is impossible to understand Mendoça's case without taking into account the Tres tratados, either as the source of, or response to his troubles, so far as they engaged the role of the princely confessor and his wider understanding of just and limited government which were relevant for his critique of his own order as well as for that of the government of Naples, capturing the inevitable frictions generated in counselling the conscience of rulers.
Conclusion
After his return to Spain, Mendoça was able to cultivate his open disobedience against Acquaviva not only because he initially enjoyed the support of the influential Lerma-faction, but also because of the special protection that Clement viii's breve had awarded him which suspended Acquaviva's order that Mendoça should return to Rome to be investigated. Over the seventeenth century, Mendoça's Advis, the Monita, and Mariana's critique became a topical trilogy within the ever-widening corpus of anti-Jesuit writing, despite some substantial differences between the three texts. While the Monita adopted the satirical device of posing as an "authentic" Jesuit regulation that supported theories of a concerted Jesuit conspiracy "via the confessional," Mariana's and Mendoça's writings were leaked testimonies, revealing deep constitutional tensions amongst the Jesuits far beyond the regulations of the Society of Jesus itself. Both Spaniards deplored the order's growing centralization and opposed in no uncertain terms the unbalanced and absolute power of the general. Mobilizing a classical argument in political theory, they identified the suppression of good counsel as a major cause and attribute of tyranny. What distinguished Mendoça's criticism from Mariana's was the urgency with which he insisted on the necessity of confession as a means of good and fraternal counsel, denouncing its distortion in the name of discipline and 
